Fiber and Security

Every day, folks in our industry deal with the dual nature of fiber-optic networks. These networks are gateways to a new universe of data and entertainment, and are valuable business assets. At the same time, they tie together our nation's critical infrastructure, connecting Wall Street to Main Street, which makes them of interest to terrorists.

This tension is not new, but was front-page news Tuesday for the Washington Post ("Dissertation Could Be Security Threat"), which examined how George Mason doctoral student Sean Gorman built a database mapping fiber optic networks from information found on the Internet. Fearful of its value to terrorists, government security officials would like to classify Gorman's work (which one web site quickly dubbed the World's Most Dangerous Database).

The story was widely discussed yesterday among network operators (see the NANOG archives) and dozens of weblogs (including Daily Kos, Hobbs Online and Instapundit).

There were expressions of surprise, even among some government security officials, that this kind of info would be public. There shouldn't be. Several commercial map companies sell fiber maps. At least three web sites identify all major North American exchange points, and at least four major American cities have detailed fiber maps online. At CarrierHotels.com, we're not disinterested observers, as our web site features information about buildings that serve as major telecom hubs.

This information is online because building owners, colocation firms and hosting providers are businesses that need to market their services. Connectivity is a key yardstick for companies evaluating hosting and disaster recovery. The government knows this, too. Most fiber maps that are online were placed there by economic development agencies touting their cities' connectivity.

What's more, classifying information about fiber networks is impractical. Laying fiber requires permitting and approval processes that generate voluminous public records. "Will backhoe operators need to have background checks if they're trenching for new fiber runs?" wondered one NANOG poster.

The genie is out of the bottle, if not on public web sites, than certainly in Google's cache. We can't pretend that public information on fiber networks can be completely hidden from terrorists, no more than it was hidden from Sean Gorman. A more productive approach is for the US homeland security team to know more about America's networks than the terrorists, and use that advantage to defend any vulnerabilities. Gorman's work, which is being shared with counter-terror officials, should be seen as a huge asset in that effort, rather than a liability.